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SUMMARY: This work tries to be an empirical sample in the study of 
learning in public policies, that is, how learning is linked to policy change. 
Particularly, we have studied political-administrative elites’ learning process 
on crisis provoked by oil spill off the coast of Spain. 
 
After expounded our premises about policy learning and the working 
hypothesis that have guided our work, we explain the methodology we have 
employed: the Nominal Group Technique, its advantages in this kind of 
research and how we used it. 
 
Finally, we display the reflection generated from the empirical work to better 
understand policy learning process. In this sense, political factors have been 
revealed as absolutely essential in order to explain what political-
administrative elites learn and whatever they decide to implement. Aspects 
that make crises different from each other (these being technical aspects) 
show up as less important than political ones. Political aspects make crisis 
                                                 
* This paper is framed into the R+D+i research project “Study on the Models of Prevention, Management 
and Evaluation of Environmental Disasters in Coastal Zones”, financed by the Spanish Ministry of 
Science and Technology. It is a comparative analysis among ten countries from three continents. 
** Francisco J. Vanaclocha is professor of Political Science at the Carlos III University of Madrid. Ruth 
Martinón and Roberto Losada are members of the Political Science Department at Carlos III University of 
Madrid. 
The authors wish to express their gratitude to the other members of the Research Project, Esther García 
Sánchez, José Ignacio Cases Méndez, Antonio Natera Peral, and Javier Ruiz Martínez, for their 
invaluable collaboration. 
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similar, because of political reasons behind the decision, communication, 
and attention strategies. 
  
Two concepts have appeared as the connection of crisis and elites’ learning: 
sensitization and political profitability. The former means the process of 
becoming fully aware of the problem, being concerned about it, and 
predisposed towards a faster and more coherent action. At the same time, it 
is difficult to imagine a government undertaking polices that involve political 
costs, or anything proved to be unprofitable. This is especially true of 
learning and implementation of whatever has been learnt from crisis that 
happened in distant points of time. 
 
Key words: Crisis management, political learning, value criteria, oil 
spill, Nominal Group Technique, disaster. 
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Damus huius neglegentiae poenas tamquam 
 novis territi,cum illa non sint nova sed insolita. 
  
We pay the penalty for this negligence in being terrified 
by things as new when they are not new but merely unusual. 
Seneca. 
 
This work tries to be an empirical sample in the study of 
learning in public policies, that is, how learning is linked to policy 
change. As Bennett and Howlett said “the concept has been 
overtheorized and underapplied”1. Particularly, we focus on political-
administrative elites’ learning process and, more specifically, on 
crises provoked by oil tankers off the coast of Spain. The main 
questions are whether or not there is any relationship between 
learning processes and beliefs systems, and whether or not that 
learning is a process strongly marked by political considerations. 
 
We have not been able to answer the first question in a 
satisfactory way, mainly because the analysed actors are hardly 
conscious of their own values and not conscious at all about their 
value criteria. In contrast, in answering the latter, we have 
discovered the explicative strength and the way of working of political 
variables. 
 
Firstly, we will start with our theoretical premises about who 
what, where when and how political-administrative elites learn, 
followed by our hypothesis and the explanation of the methodology 
employed, finishing with conclusions. 
 
Premises 
 
We adopt Heclo’s definition of learning, who considers that 
“learning can be taken to mean a relatively enduring alteration in 
                                                 
1 C. J. BENNET & M. HOWLETT (1992): “The lessons of learning: Reconciling theories of policy 
learning and policy change” in Policy Sciences 25, 275-294, p. 288. 
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behaviour that results from experience”2, understanding experience 
in a wide sense. Therefore, it would include both direct based 
experience learning, and learning grounded in reflection about one’s 
own or others’ experience.3
 
We disagree with the idea that “It may be impossible to 
observe the learning activity in isolation from the change requiring 
explanation. We may only know that learning is taking place because 
policy change is taking place”4. We consider, according to the 
previous definition of learning, that learning itself is different from its 
implementation; in fact, to analyse what obstacles impede the use of 
what has been learnt arises as an interesting field for further 
research. 
 
 We do not discuss whether the individuals learn or what the 
organizations’ learning capability is. Instead we focus on the 
research of political-administrative elites’ learning in crisis, since we 
are especially interested in the political aspects of policy learning as 
it concerns this subject.5 Because of the position of power these 
elites already mantain, the influence of political factors on the 
capability to implement whatever has been learnt, is refered to other 
different questions than that one.  
 
 When talking about the object of learning, that is, whatever is 
learnt, there are four different dimensions:  
 
a) The improvement of technical skills. 
b) The understanding of the underlying causal theory of the 
events6 and the understanding of the state of the problem’s 
variables.7  
                                                 
2 H. HECLO (1974): Modern social Politics in Britain and Sweden. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, p. 306. 
3 E. STERN (1997): “Crisis and Learning: A Conceptual Balance Sheet”, en Journal of contingencies and 
crisis management, 5, 2, 69-86. 
4 C. J. BENNET & M. HOWLETT (1992): Op.Cit. p. 290. Although we understand than sometimes this 
assumption is useful as Birkland explicitly does in his study of aviation safety [T. A. BIRKLAND (2004): 
“Learning and Policy Improvement After Disaster”, in American Behavioural Scientist, 48, 3, 341-364, p. 
344] 
5 Although, finally, dealing with learning in organizations was inevitable. . 
6 P. J. MAY (1992): “Policy Learning and Failure”, in Journal of Public Policy 12, 4, 331-354, p. 337. 
7 P. A. SABATIER (1987): “Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, and Policy Change”, in Knowledge: 
Creation, Diffusion, Utilization, 8, 4, 649-692, p. 672. 
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c) Political learning in the sense of Sabatier’s seeking to 
advocate one’s own beliefsystem and also in the sense of 
improving the political skills of managing a crisis. 
d) Moral learning8, or learning of values or policy goals. 
 
Among these issues we concentrate our research on political 
learning, on political and administrative elites’ values, because of the 
deep relationship that can be supposed to exist between them. 
Although we accept that it is very difficult to change deeply rooted 
values, as most of scholars say9, we think it is possible that crisis 
provokes at the very least a traumatic renewal of value criteria. 
 
 Following learning general literature10 we adopt as a premise 
that in crises there is a special kind of learning (tacit learning versus 
articulated learning), which is only acquired through the experience 
itself; it is spread and difficult to teach, because it is hard to 
transform it into articulate speech. That is why one reacts following 
the lessons internalised by his own experience when a crisis arises.  
Since it is highly improbable the actor to live through a similar crisis 
again, it is very difficult to apply whatever has been learnt.11  
 
 On the other hand, there are more possibilities for learning 
when the degree of interest and attention is enhanced by a crisis 
situation. This is what we are going to call sensitisation. 
 
In conclusion, our special interest in studying relationships 
between political aspects and learning in crisis is specified by the 
concentration of our attention on the political-administrative elites 
                                                 
8 E. STERN (1997): Op. Cit., p. 70. 
9 A relevant exception may be the shifts of policy paradigms thought by P. Hall. Even Sabatier actually 
recognizes that changes in the deep normative core of the beliefs systems are possible, although they 
would be very difficult, akin to a religious conversion. 
10 G. RYLE (1949): The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson’s University Library; M. POLANYI 
(1959): The Study of Man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; M. OAKESHOTT (1962): Rationalism 
in Politics. London: Methuen; M. OAKESHOTT (1975): On Human Conduct. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
11 The Fox and the Cat: A fox was boasting to a cat of its clever devices for escaping its enemies. "I have 
a whole bag of tricks," he said, "which contains a hundred ways of escaping my enemies." "I have only 
one," said the cat. "But I can generally manage with that." Just at that moment they heard the cry of a 
pack of hounds coming towards them, and the cat immediately scampered up a tree and hid herself in the 
boughs. "This is my plan," said the cat. "What are you going to do?" The fox thought first of one way, 
then of another, and while he was debating, the hounds came nearer and nearer, and at last the fox in his 
confusion was caught up by the hounds and soon killed by the huntsmen.Miss Puss, who had been 
looking on, said, "Better one safe way than a hundred on which you cannot reckon." [J. JACOBS (1996): 
The Fables of Æsop. New York: Schocken Books, p. 91-92].  
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(the subject of learning), political and value learning (the object of 
learning), political considerations as conditions for learning or its 
implementation. There are three fields where these political aspects 
are concentrated, or rather, where political learning takes place: 
decision strategies; communication strategies; and attention (help) to 
victims strategies (care strategies). 
 
 
Working hypothesis 
 
 These reflections are specified in the following statements by 
way of several general hypotheses: 
 
1. Learning process of political-administrative elites in crisis is 
specially conditioned by political factors. They are the main 
driving forces of and barriers to the learning process. 
2. Sensitisation is different from learning but is important in the 
crisis learning process. Sensitisation interferes with the 
possibility and predisposition of elites to learn. 
3. Political learning takes place mainly in three fields: decision 
strategy, communication strategy and care strategy. 
4. Traumatic crises provoke changes in value criteria of 
political-administrative elites. 
 
 
Employed Methodology 
 
In order to check our hypothesis we chose the Nominal Group 
Technique (NGT). NGT was developed early in the seventies by 
Delbecq and van de Ven, with the purpose of facilitating effective 
group decision making in social psychological research. Thanks to its 
flexibility, it allows for considerable diversity in its application in a 
variety of contexts, 
 
This technique was revealed as a powerful tool 
to generate ideas and prioritise issues in a 
wide range of fields including: education, 
health, social service, industry, and 
government organisations.12
 
                                                 
12 M. POTTER; S. GORDON & P.  HAMER (2004): ”The Nominal Group Technique: A useful 
consensus methodology in physiotherapy research”, in NZ Journal of Physiotherapy 32, 3. 
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It was initially devised for use as a mean of brainstorming the 
views of the group on a specific problem, and of achieving an 
aggregate of the group’s opinions about the solution to the problem.13 
Contrary to the focus group this technique prevents the appearance 
of dominant members who impose their opinions on others. NGT 
avoids dominance by a limited number of group leaders in 
establishing priorities or goals.14
 
In fact, Kae H. Chung and Michael J. Ferris, in a study that 
looked at the validity of the nominal group technique, underlined 
that a “recommendation for the use of nominal group process is that 
there are some noninteracting group members who are better than 
the interacting group members in their judgments” 15, and the 
former are usually silenced by the latter in focus groups.  
 
Another advantage claimed for the NGT is the great number 
of ideas that are generated in the silent phase. Notwithstanding, this 
number is always manageable. That is why we chose nominal group 
over structured interviews in our research: 
 
We want people to listen to us (…) The process 
improves listening and the results can be used to 
benefit the people who shared the information. And 
people go away feeling good about having been 
heard.16
 
Although NGT is a structured group activity designed to elicit the 
views of group members on a given topic, Thad B. Green points out 
that: 
 
There were no statistical significant differences 
between the quantity of nominal group performance 
and the performance of interacting groups employing 
permissive, democratic, and authoritarian leadership 
styles (…) The important finding is that with respect 
to the total number of responses, the number of 
                                                 
13 A. DELBECQ; A. VAN DE VEN. & D. GUSTAFSON. (1971): Group Techniques for global 
planning. A Guide to Nominal Group and Delphi Processes. Middleton, WI: Green Briar Press. 
14 A. VAN DEN VEN & A. L. DELBECQ (1971): “Nominal Versus Interacting Group Processes for 
Committee Decision-Making Effectiveness”, in Academy of Management Journal 14, 2, 203-212. 
15 K. CHUNG & M. FERRIS (1971): “An Inquiry of the Nominal Group Process”, in The Academy of 
Management Journal 14, 4, 520-524. 
16 R. A. KRUEGER (1994): Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage. 
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unique responses, and the total quality of responses 
there were no significant differences between the 
nominal groups and any of the interacting groups.17
 
Nevertheless, there is a real superiority over interacting groups, and 
an important strength of the NGTis that it focuses on the 
participants’ points of view, rather than those of the director of the 
group. Furthermore, with this technique we avoid a real danger that 
affects focus groups: the views obtained will be those of the 
dominant members of the group, rather than those of the majority. 
Moreover, NGT increases creative productivity of shared activities, 
elicits a critique of generation of ideas, allows results to be 
considered as a pool of aggregative ideas, and makes use of the 
energy of the individuals integrated in the group.  
 
The nominal group technique combines quantitative 
and qualitative data collection in a group setting, and 
avoids problems of group dynamics associated with 
other group methods such as brainstorming, Delphi 
and focus groups. Idea generation and problem 
solving are combined in a structured group process, 
which encourages and enhances the participation of 
group members.18, 19
 
                                                 
17 T. B. GREEN (1975): “An Empirical Analysis of Nominal and Interacting Groups”, in The Academy of 
Management Journal 18, 1, p. 71. 
18 M. GALLAGHER; T. HARES; J. SPENCER; C. BRADSHAW & I. WEBB (1993): ”The nominal 
group technique: a research tool for general practice?” In Family Practice, 1993, vol. 10, 76-81. 
19 Michael Quinn Patton describes the specific characteristics of quantitative and qualitative research: 
“Quantitative methods consist of three kinds of data collection: (1) in-depth, open-ended interviews; 8”9 
direct observation; and (3) written documents, including such sources as open-ended written items on 
questionnaires, personal diaries, and program records. (…) Qualitative methods permit the evaluator to 
study selected issues, cases, or events in depth and detail; the fact that data collection is not constrained 
by predetermined categories of analysis contributes to the depth and detail of qualitative data (…) 
Qualitative data provide and detail through direct quotation and careful description of program situations, 
events, people, interactions and observed behaviors. (…) In collecting qualitative data, the evaluators seek 
to capture the richness of people’s experiences in their own terms. Understanding and meaning emerge 
from in-depth analysis of detailed descriptions and verbatim quotations.” (M. Q. PATTON (1987): How 
to Use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation (CSE Program Evaluation Kit). California: Sage, pp. 7-10). 
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The desirable advantages of the NGT compared with other 
group techniques are listed in the following table: 
 
Attribute Delphi Focus Group Brainstorming NGT 
Face-to face group meeting 
process 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Generates a large number of 
ideas 
Yes Maybe Maybe Yes 
Avoids focusing on a single train 
of thought 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Encourages equal input from all 
participants 
Yes No No Yes 
Highly structured process Yes Maybe No Yes 
High degree of task completion Yes Maybe No Yes 
Provision of immediate feedback No Maybe Maybe Yes 
Measures the relative importance 
of ideas generated 
Yes No No Yes 
Source: Margaret Potter, Dandy Gordon and Peter Hamer, op. cit. 
 
The production of ideas in a NGT is not the result of a 
common interactive process, but of a silent and individual activity 
developed in the first step of the technique. That is to say, it is a 
technique that works like a group only in a formal way20. The term 
nominal refers to a process in which individuals work alone with the 
results of their efforts later combined and viewed as if the individuals 
had worked together in a group.21
 
                                                 
20 Why is the anonymous interaction important?   It is not our goal to answer this question here, but we do 
want to remark on the assumption behind the recommendation of a NGT. All the participants, it is felt, 
posses, at least some valuable qualities for making high quality decisions. Unfortunately, sometimes, 
these members are not social-interacting members, so an anonymous generation of ideas enhances their 
ability to provide valuable information. Following Jourard: As children we are, and we act, our real 
selves. We say what we think, we scream for what we want, we tell what we did. These spontaneous 
disclosures meet variable consequences —some disclosures are ignored, some rewarded, and some 
punished. Doubtless in accordance with the law of reinforcement, we learn early to withhold certain 
disclosures because of the painful consequences to which they lead. We are punished in our society, not 
only for what we actually do, but also for what we think, feel or want. Very soon, then, the growing child 
learns to display a highly expurgated version of his self to others. I have coined the term “public self” to 
refer to the concept of oneself which one wants others to believe.” [S. M JOURARD (1964): The 
Transparent Self. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand]. We can say NGT is like a child’s game: it has obtained, 
in a brief period of time, something really interesting for organizations: “transform the boring group 
meetings into golden opportunities in order to solve problems” and avoid the “energetic crisis of 
management”. (A. L. FORTUNA, (1971): “ntroduction”, in Group Techniques for global planning. A 
Guide to Nominal Group and Delphi Processes. Middleton, Wi: Green Briar Press, p. 13). 
21 D. W. TAYLOR; P. C. BERRY & C. H. BLOCK (1958): “Does Group Participation When Using 
Brainstorming Facilitate or Inhibit Creative Thinking?”, in  Administrative Science Quarterly 3, pp. 23-
47. 
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It seems clear to us that the unique contribution of the NGT, 
the semi-quantitative, rank-ordered feedback data obtained from the 
participants, makes this technique particularly useful in evaluating 
the learning process which is produced in the aftermath of a crisis. 
 
If we concede that NGT is, definitively, a technique for idea 
generation, problem solution, and fact-finding, we must accept that 
there are unlimited possibilities to its application. Notwithstanding, 
it seems clear to us that there are certain limits, or more appropriate 
tasks in which NGT is required. NGT reveals its full potential when: 
 
a) The central issue of the meeting is considered 
extraordinarily important, or, at least important. 
(For example: learning process evaluation). 
b) We seek the widest vision of the issue. (Crises 
learning process). 
c) The ultimate goal is to prioritise problems or 
solutions in the framework of a traditional 
meeting.22 (Unveil difficulties hidden in crises 
learning process). 
 
All these things allow us to consider NGT as an evaluation 
tool, with a constructive and problem-solving approach, that enables 
the participants to identify the needs of future changes, in order to 
enhance the lessons that can be extracted from a crisis, and to 
recognize the weaknesses and strengths of the present learning 
process. 
 
Graph 1 shows how we understand the role of NGT in the 
learning process framework.23 The NGT is inserted in the very 
process of learning. If we accept that learning is produced in the 
aftermath of a crisis, we can consider this technique as a step in this 
learning. The participants, who are political decision-makers involved 
in crisis management and recovery, elicit, through the NGT, both the 
mistakes and the wise moves made during the crisis learning 
process. It is more important to discover the way in which a problem, 
—a crisis— has been resolved, than the actual solution. There are 
always a wide variety of ways to solve the crises; some being more 
                                                 
22 A. GUILLÉN ZANÓN (1990): “La Técnica del Grupo Nominal”, in Documentación Administrativa 
223, 53-75, p. 56. 
23 We use the very attractive and clear stickman analysis. As we know it was first developed by 
Economist Jesús Huerta de Soto. (See J. HUERTA DE SOTO (1992): Socialismo, cálculo económico y 
función empresarial. Madrid: Unión Editorial,  pp. 80-81.) 
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time-expensive than others. The less time-expensive ones are 
advantageous, because of their shortcutting nature: they can be 
implemented in a brief period of time, and their success can be 
observed immediately. Nevertheless, the more time-expensive ones, 
i.e., solutions that take more time to be achieved, are more universal, 
more valid and have a higher degree of fertility and productivity. 
Learning takes time; it is a time-expensive process with a universal 
validity. Therefore NGTs show us what was involved in this process—
whether through shortcuts or in an efficient universal way—, and it 
is included in the process of learning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the authors 
 
Our participants were selected because they share certain 
characteristics with the topic of the focus group. Four of them had 
direct experience in the Aegean Sea and Prestige crises, —moreover, 
one of them had direct experience in another previous crisis: the oil 
spill provoked by the tanker Cason—. There were three analysts and 
specialised managers in the issue. Finally, we completed the session, 
with an expert in technological and industrial disasters. 
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NGT demands that participants be self-spectators, that they 
analyse their own learning process. The rules of constructive 
feedback that govern the procedure elicit participants’ positive and 
negative constructive thinking in an inclusive and non-judgemental 
atmosphere. Participants discover a new interest to be made better 
off. 
 
Therefore we use NGT as an evaluation tool with a 
constructive and problem-solving approach that enables the 
participants to identify the needs of future changes in order to 
enhance the lessons that can be extracted from a crisis, and to 
recognize the weaknesses and strengths of the present learning 
process. 
 
The first question elicited positive comments about the 
learning process: how much the decision makers learn, and what 
they learned from the two most significant oil spill crises suffered off 
the coast of Spain: the Aegean Sea oil spill and the Prestige incident. 
 
The second question, following the constructive approach, 
elicited suggestions for improvements in the learning process. In 
order to do so, the participants were confronted with the need to 
identify what they had not learned from these crises and what to do 
to improve the possibility of a correct and enduring learning process. 
 
Briefly, can NGT lead to conclusions that improve 
participants’ experience? We can answer this question affirmatively. . 
The main benefit is a greater understanding of the learning process 
that the participants underwent as decision makers in both the 
crises of the Aegean Sea and the Prestige incidents. 
 
Lomax and McLeman24  pointed out a flaw related to the 
reduced number of participants in a NGT: there are doubts as to 
whether the results can be generalized to the whole group of decision 
makers. Does the NGT process influence the results? Do the results 
reflect the sum of the individual member’s views or the consensus 
view claimed for the method? If the former, then the results we have 
obtained may be generalized to a larger fraction of the decision 
makers. 
 
                                                 
24 P. LOMAX & P. McLEMAN (1984): “The uses and abuses of nominal group technique in 
Polytechnique evaluation”, in Studies on Higher Education 9, 183-190. 
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Another difficulty is related to the role played by the 
facilitator. Only the complete adherence to the highly structured 
nature of the process can guarantee that the researcher-bias is 
minimised. Otherwise, the questions could search to confirm the 
analyst’s hypothesis instead of allowing participants to make a 
meaningful and free contribution.  
 
In order to overcome this Scylla and Charybdis situation, we 
implemented two solutions. First, we complete the NGT with a 
questionnaire, which must be understood as an extension of the 
issues discussed in the group. 
 
The questionnaire extension of the NGT provides 
back-up evidence of the reliability of the data derived 
from the technique and enables it to be applied to 
larger groups (…).25
 
Moreover, we developed focus interviews with other decision 
makers who were involved in the Aegean Sea and Prestige crises. In 
this sense we can consider the NGT that we carried out as a prior 
analysis of the situation, in order to elaborate an accurate interview 
guide setting forth the major areas of inquiry and the hypotheses, 
which provide relevant criteria for the data to be obtained through 
the interview.26
 
Secondly, our NGT was directed by an expert facilitator who 
was not a member of the research team. We seek, by this method, to 
enhance the objectivity of the results and to avoid the self-
confirmation of our hypothesis. 
 
Finally, we would like to point out a line for further investigation. 
Chung and Ferris, in the article cited above, identify three subgroups 
in the leaderless discussion sessions. “They are: (a) high talkers (or 
interacting members), (b) medium talkers (or in-between), and (c) 
low-talkers (or noninteracting members).”27 There is no place here to 
discuss these results, but we have discovered, after the 
implementation of numerous nominal group techniques, that there is 
always another specific character among the participants: we call 
him/her radical participant. Usually this specific character is 
                                                 
25 G. LLOYD-JONES; S. FOWELL & J. B. BLIGH (1990): “The use of the nominal group technique as 
an evaluative tool in medical undergraduate education”, In Medical Education 33, 8-13, p.8. 
26 R. K. MERTON (1990): Focused Interview. New York: Free Press. 
27 R. K. MERTON (1990): Op. Cit., p. 521. 
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unveiled at the very beginning of the session. He express radical 
ideas related to the issue or the objective of the meeting, and he 
usually denies the basis of the hypothesis. In our NGT, the radical 
participant expressed his commitment to the idea of the inexistence 
of the Aegean Sea and Prestige crises. He stated that these were not 
crises, but only isolated incidents. A deeper psychological study 
could be carried out to explain this curious phenomenon. We only 
want to indicate its existence and to show its advantages: 
 
a) Enhances the discussion of the issues. 
b) Obliges other participants to be clearer in their interventions. 
c) Provokes a deeper reflection about the ideas generated in the 
silent phase. 
d) Allows a more precise definition of group consensus to 
appear. 
 
 
Post empirical conclusions 
 
 The reflection and analysis on empirical material products 
from questionnaires and NGT have been useful in answering some, 
though not all of the questions we had stated, having generated 
other important ideas that help to explain the role of political factors 
in the crisis learning process. 
 
 Indeed, political factors have been revealed as absolutely 
essential in order to explain what political-administrative elites learn. 
First of all, it is necessary to point out that in this kind of crisis, at 
least in Spain, political polarization comes out and everything 
(including the most technical aspects) is more determined by 
partisan fights than other issues of ‘normal’ political life. We have to 
remember that in a crisis, “perceived opportunity, as well as 
perceived threat, can be a source of stress for crisis participants”28, 
even more so if we consider that they fall under close media scrutiny. 
 
 Let us look at one important aspect that arose at the 
beginning of the session: the singularity of every oil tanker accident 
by itself. That is, each accident is so different from the others that 
comparisons with other kinds of crises become possible (food crisis, 
terrorists attacks, natural disasters…). Therefore, although technical 
learning is possible —and in fact it is produced—, the main learning 
                                                 
28 E. STERN (1997): Op.Cit. p. 73. 
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is political, the one element that is common to all these crises, 
characterized by their presence in mass-media, the general social 
feeling of risk, and the social demand of effective management. 
 
 Among all aspects that have been considered such as drives 
or barriers to learning in crises, we want to point out the idea of 
sensitisation; this being a positive factor meaning the process of 
becoming fully aware of the problem, being concerned about it, and 
predisposed towards a faster and more coherent action. We affirm 
that government elites’ learning is especially biased by political 
dimension; it is mainly the result of the sensitisation generated by 
the crisis. The importance of this fact is far greater not only because 
of the sensitisation that these elites can experience, but because of 
the sensitisation they can observe in society and the mass media.  
 
Therefore, sensitisation has been revealed as the key or 
connection between the crises and elites’ learning. Administrative-
political elites can be sensitised themselves by the facts. Crises 
interfere with the normal operation of politics, and jeopardize the 
positive public image presently enjoyed by politicians. At any rate, 
they are always sensitive to whatever they perceive as social 
sensitisation, reflected in crisis conspicuousness (the mass-media 
covered the Prestige crisis for nine months)29, in opinion polls, and in 
the continuity of policies related to it.  
                                                 
29 N. GONZÁLEZ, F. TALAYERO y M. ROIZ (2003): “El análisis de contenido como método de 
investigación del discurso social sobre los desastres: el caso del Prestige”, Comunicación en la 1ª Sesión 
técnica del Foro Euromediterráneo sobre Prevención de Catástrofes. 
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Sensitisation and learning. 
Source: the authors 
 
 
 Moreover, crisis management will generate different kinds of 
learning according to its success or its failure. It seems to us that 
successful management generates incremental normal learning 
because sensitisation has little endurance. Notwithstanding, when 
early crisis management fails, sensitisation takes longer, increasing 
political profitability which enhances learning. 
 
 Political sensitisation is brought about by political 
profitability. Here we want to introduce an appropriate new concept: 
the political profitability bias (P.P.B.), that concentrates the main 
explicative force of the relationship between sensitisation and elites’ 
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learning in crises. It is difficult to imagine a government undertaking 
policies that involve political costs, or anything proved to be 
unprofitable. This is especially true of learning and implementation 
of whatever has been learnt from crises that happened in distant 
points of time. 
 
Sensitisation, P.P.B. & Learning. 
Source: the authors 
 
 
 
 Crisis forecasting is one of the aspects where we can 
appreciate this bias.  This kind of prevention is less profitable than 
crisis management, mainly because of the following reasons: First, 
because crisis management always generates profit opportunities 
(Stern). Second, because prevention policies are not specially 
differentiated. Third, because politicians think that as long as they 
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are in charge, crises are not going to happen. In democracies they 
are not there for a long time, thus they prefer to assume the crisis 
occurrence risk instead of preventing it. Some time ago Richardson 
pointed out this relation between crisis and reactive style30. 
 
 But when a crisis has occurred we are in a completely 
different scene. An environment of sensitisation prevails where social 
actors become demanders of prevention. Then innovative learning 
oriented to post-traumatic prevention appears. We were able to 
observe that after Prestige incident, many policies which had already 
been designed but not applied were implemented because they 
unveiled their political profitability. 
 
 Secondly, the political profitability bias is a barrier to 
implementing whatever has been learnt. In the Prestige case, for 
example, we find the volunteers conundrum (muddle). Political-
administrative elites learnt that the massive and chaotic presence of 
these spontaneous social actors may be extremely dangerous 
(because of ecological damage) and expensive (because of the 
tremendous waste they generated). Nevertheless, it is quite 
improbable that this phenomenon could be limited in similar future 
events, since this limitation would not be politically correct and, 
therefore it would not produce political profitability. Quite the 
contrary, this popular participation legitimates crisis management, 
that is to say, it creates political profitability. 
  
 A third interesting question is how difficult the enforcement of 
law can be because of political reasons. One of the most required 
elements to improve crisis management is the increase of 
coordination.31 In Spain, the Civil Protection Act establishes the 
unified command to deal with this kind of crisis. However, since the 
political cost of applying it without taking regional governments into 
consideration would be so high, national government does not 
consider its effective application. Even though the central 
administration assumes responsibility for decisions, —there is no 
need to ask for advice from regional or local administrations—,it does 
                                                 
30 J. J. RICHARDSON (1982): Policy Styles in Western Europe. London: Allen and Unwin. 
31 One interesting issue of debate that appeared in TGN was the role of planning in order to achieve good 
coordination; but everybody agreed on the need for real unified command. Increasing importance is being 
given to the idea that the aim of learning to improve crisis management is not to create pre-planned 
motions, but “to form teams that can move forward in a mutually supportive, structured manner when 
potentially discomforting signals are detected around sensitive issues” [P. LAGADEC (1997): “Learning 
Processes for Crisis Management in Complex Organizations”, in Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 5, 1, 24- 31, p. 27]. 
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not in fact, act freely: It fears adverse reactions from other 
administrations and the loss of political profitability which they 
imply. 
 
 We faced a similar problem when the possibility of using 
shelter harbours was evoked. Although these could be the best 
solution in ecological and socio-economical terms, there is no room 
to operate in this direction because political fighting with the affected 
councils would be far too expensive in political terms. That is to say, 
it would not be politically profitable. 
 
 With regard to the communication strategy, we have 
confirmed its overwhelming importance as a framework to elites’ 
learning in crisis. As Lagadec says “An actor’s power is often 
determined by his ability to present a strong image to the outside 
world”32. Yet precisely, because of the very existence of the 
relationship between learning and political profitability, learning 
from communication is so important. A fortiori, we consider that the 
crisis picture constructed by the communication process is more 
relevant than objective data when the time comes for it to be 
evaluated.   
 
One of the main risks of communication processes is the loss 
of control over the information delivered; it takes on a life of its own. 
The goal of good crisis management is to transform the 
communication process into a leadership process which seeks to 
channel the tension and victim’s doubts, and creates a holding 
environment (Giulliani’s syndrome). 
 
 There is a close relation between communication and care 
strategy. In a previous crisis suffered by this Spanish region, 
compensations to affected workers were paid several years later, and 
there were people who complained that they never received them. In 
the Prestige crisis, however, the government was very interested in 
this point and started to pay within fifteen days. This is a good 
sample of political learning. Because of the high political profitability 
of the indemnifications, they were generous and quickly delivered. In 
fact, some people felt so satisfied that the idea of the crisis as a 
beneficial event was experienced. 
 
                                                 
32 P. LAGADEC (1997): Op. Cit., p. 26. 
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Finally we acknowledge that we have not been able to answer 
properly the questions about belief systems, values and value 
criteria. On one side, the aim was to look for the relationship 
between the different elites’ belief systems33 (more or less ecologically 
minded, more or less socially generous, etc.) studied through the 
questionnaires, and their predisposition towards learning. We did not 
have enough analysis units to investigate this. On the other side, we 
expected to observe the recognition of changes in values or value 
criteria, but it was revealed that it is extremely difficult to make 
people think about what criteria they use to evaluate something, 
even more so if they have changed those criteria over the time.  
 
In any case, what can be observed from the outside is the way 
that learning, as criteria value, replaces sustainability. That is to say: 
before the crisis, nobody is concerned with learning; the important 
thing to do is to keep those policies already recognised as profitable. 
Here, we find again the concepts of sensitisation and political 
profitability at the very core of our analysis. Political-administrative 
elites change their value criteria since they realise that learning and 
policy change have an increased value as a result of crisis 
occurrence. 
 
 In conclusion, it is difficult for political-administrative elites 
to learn, and when they do learn it is difficult for them to see 
themselves managing another crisis, so they cannot apply whatever 
they have learnt. At the same time, societies usually lack historical 
memory, although they are not responsible for this. Therefore, we 
have to think about the way organizations can keep all this 
knowledge alive; the knowledge people acquire but cannot maintain 
and transmit in a proper way. 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Following the belief systems general structure of the Advocacy Coalition Framework [P. A. 
SABATIER and H. C. JENKINS-SMITH (eds.) (1993): Policy Change and Learning. An advocacy 
coalition Approach. Boulder-san Francisco-Oxford: Westview Press]. 
Documentos de Trabajo “Política y Gestión” 4/2005 20 
Traumatic Renewal of Values and Value Criteria in Crisis Management 
 
References 
 
BENNET, K. & HOWLETT (1992): “The lessons of learning: 
Reconciling theories of policy change”, in Policy Sciences 25, 275-
298. 
 
CHUNG, K. & FERRIS, M. (1971): “An Inquiry of the Nominal Group 
Process”, in The Academy of Management Journal, 14, 4, 520-524.  
 
DELBECQ, A.; VAN DE VEN, A. & GUSTAFSON, D. (1971): Group 
Techniques for global planning. A Guide to Nominal Group and Delphi 
Processes. Middleton, Wi: Green Briar Press. 
 
FORTUNA, A. L. (1971): “Introduction”, in Group Techniques for 
global planning. A Guide to Nominal Group and Delphi Processes. 
Middleton, Wi: Green Briar Press.  
 
GALLAGHER, M.; HARES, T.; SPENCER, J.; BRADSHAW, C. & 
WEBB, I. (1993): “The nominal group technique: a research tool for 
general practice?”, in Family Practice 10, 76-81.  
 
GONZÁLEZ, N.; TALAYERO, F. & ROIZ, M. (2003): “El análisis de 
contenido como método de investigación del discurso social sobre los 
desastres: el caso del Prestige”, Comunicación en la 1º Sesión técnica 
del Foro Euromediterráneo sobre Prevención de Catástrofes, del 6 al 
8 de octubre. 
 
GREEN, T. B. (1975) “An Empirical Analysis of Nominal and 
Interacting Groups”; in The Academy of Management Journal 18, 1, 
63-74. 
 
GUILLÉN ZANÓN, A. (1990): “La Técnica del Grupo Nominal”, in 
Documentación Administrativa 223, 53-75. 
 
HECLO, H. (1974): Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden. New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
 
HUERTA DE SOTO, J. (1992): Socialismo, cálculo económico y función 
empresarial. Madrid: Unión Editorial. 
 
JOURARD S. M. (1964): The Transparent Self. Princeton, NJ: Van 
Nostrand,. 
Documentos de Trabajo “Política y Gestión” 4/2005 
 
21 
F. J. Vanaclocha, R. Martinón y R. Losada 
 
KRUEGER, R. A. (1994): Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied 
Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 
LAGUEDEC, P. (1997): “Learning Processes for Crisis Mangement in 
Complex Organizations”, in Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Magement 5, 1, 24-31. 
 
LLOYD-JONES, G.; FOWELL, S. & BLIGH, J. G. (1999): “The use of 
the nominal group technique as an evaluative tool in medical 
undergraduate education”, in Medical Education 33, 8-13. 
 
LOMAX, P. & McLEMAN, P. (1984): “The uses and abuses of nominal 
group technique in Polytechnique evaluation”, in Studies on Higher 
Education 9, 183-190.  
 
MAY, P. J. (1992): “Policy Learning and Failure”, in Journal of Public 
Policy 12, 4, 331-354. 
 
MERTON, R. K., (1990): Focused Interview. New York: Free Press. 
 
OAKESHOTT, M. (1972): Rationalism in Politics. London: Methuen. 
 
OAKESHOTT, M. (1975): On Human Conduct. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
PATTON, M. Q. (1987): How to Use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation 
(CSE Program Evaluation Kit). California: Sage. 
 
POLANYI, M. (1959): The Study of Man. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
POTTER, M.; GORDON, S. & HAMER, P. (2004): “The Nominal Group 
Technique: A useful consensus methodology in physiotherapy 
research”, in NZ Journal of Physiotherapy 32, 3, 126-130.  
 
RICHARDSON, J. J. (1982): Policy Styles in Western Europe. London: 
Allen and Unwin. 
 
RYLE, G. (1949): The Concepto of Mine. London: Hutchinson’s 
University Library. 
 
Documentos de Trabajo “Política y Gestión” 4/2005 22 
Traumatic Renewal of Values and Value Criteria in Crisis Management 
SABATIER, P. A. (1987): “Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, and 
Policy Change”, in Knoledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 8, 4, 649-
692. 
 
SABATIER, P. A. & JENKINS-SMITH (eds.) (1993): Policy Change and 
Learning. An Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder-San Francisco-
Oxford: Westview Press. 
 
STERN, E. (1997): “Crisis and Learning: A Conceptual Balance 
Sheet”, in Journal of contingencies and crisis management 5, 2, 69-
86. 
 
TAYLOR, D. W.; BERRY, P. C. & BLOCK, C. H. (1958): “Does Group 
Participation When Using Brainstorming Facilitate or Inhibit Creative 
Thinking?” in Administrative Science Quarterly, 3, 23-47.  
 
VAN DEN VEN, A. & DELBECQ, A. L. (1971): “Nominal Versus 
Interacting Group Processes for Committee Decision-Making 
Effectiveness”, in Academy of Management Journal 14, 2, 203-212. 
 
 
 
 
 
Documentos de Trabajo “Política y Gestión” 4/2005 
 
23 
